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Abstract
The ailing U.S. health care system faces two tremendous challenges: a rising health care
bill and a growing number of uninsured individuals. Several policies have been enacted
to tackle these challenges but they are short-term patchwork solutions rather than long-
term holistic solutions needed to address structural issues. Despite the market-based
aspect of the U.S. healthcare system, self-correction of structural inefficiencies is unlikely
to happen. A new care model has to disrupt the current care system. In line with this
observation, we propose to analyze the potential of a new primary care delivery as a
solution to address the two key challenges threatening to destabilize the U.S. health care.
Based on our analysis of the literature, we note that chronic diseases account for a large
proportion of the health care bill. Yet, the delivery model to provide chronic care, where
primary care plays a central role, is inefficient, fragmented and insufficient.
Compounding these ailments, primary care is facing its own crisis resulting from the
shortage of generalist doctors and the inflating demand for primary care services. As
primary care is critical for the continuity and coordination of medical care, resolving the
urgent situation facing this branch of practice should be a top priority to improve quality
of care while reducing health care costs. Every stakeholder in the current health care
system should collectively contribute to the primary care model redesign endeavor.
To this end, we apply an engineering system approach to devise an appropriate course of
actions for health care businesses, health care providers and policy-makers in redesigning
primary care. We discuss insights gained through a collaborative project with a local
hospital to model and simulate a new primary care practice. These insights were geared
to guide decision-makers in the design of care processes, resources allocation and
appointment rules.
In conclusion, we show that primary care has a critical role to play in the much-needed
revolution of the U.S. health care system. It will require active collaboration of health
care providers, business leaders and policy-makers to enable this disruptive change.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Mahender Singh
Research Director, Center for Transportation and Logistics
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
Health is perhaps the most valuable asset a person has, at least it is a truth that is revealed
during an episode of illness. In fact, a reliable, high-quality, affordable and accessible
health care system is crucial not only to the well being of the individual but also to the
economy of a nation. Interestingly, countries have adopted different approaches to
manage their health care systems. While most have adopted universal coverage with
strong support from the government (i.e., France), a few have adopted a market-based
system (i.e., the United States).
Every nation is faced with health care system challenges, for the difficulty to optimally
allocate limited and costly resources to serve an ever-increasing demand. In particular,
the U.S. health care system, where the costs are high compared to other industrialized
nations', has been ailing for several decades. It is one of the most interesting health care
systems to study as it is a complex system that encourages cutting-edge innovation in
health care while at the same time managing to deliver subpar quality of care when
compared to other countries. We will take a deep look into the confounding challenges of
the U.S. health care system and apply engineering systems approaches to study them.
Various studies published by the Institute of Medicine have analyzed the U.S. system and
recommended actions to mitigate problems pertaining to quality, efficiency and access2.
Skyrocketing healthcare costs and growing number of uninsured individuals are exposing
the existing inefficiencies and burdening an already struggling system. Local
improvement initiatives pioneered by states and hospitals seem unable to handle nation-
wide challenges.
1OECD Health Data 2008
2 The Institute of Medicine published several books on the U.S. health care challenges: The Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System (2000), Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st
Century (2001)
1.2 Motivation
There is a pressing need for a game changing solution to stabilize the U.S. health care
system. Given the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. healthcare system, as we will explain later,
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" will not correct market inefficiencies. Compounding
these shortcomings, the inherent uncertainty of health and medical delivery creates
information asymmetry at every level, leading to frequent market failures such as adverse
selection or moral hazard. The flow of information and the power relationships among
health care stakeholders are obscured by these market failures, limiting their ability to
interact and collaborate decisively.
Indeed, a patchwork of solutions will not be sufficient for this ailing health care system.
A simple model focusing on a single aspect of the problem cannot capture the complexity
of the situation. Every stakeholder has a role to play individually and collectively in
helping to improve the U.S. health care system. A system-thinking driven approach
presents a promising avenue to tackle such a critical challenge in an innovative and
effective way. A comprehensive view of the situation will lead to effective actions for the
betterment of the system as a whole.
My thesis is an attempt to shed some light on underlying issues and contribute to this
endeavor, to offer a holistic view of a large-scale problem and provide a broad range of
perspective for better alignment between policy makers, businesses and medical
providers. Policy makers can promote and coordinate actions, businesses can innovate
and help medical practitioners to do their job more efficiently, and medical providers can
institute change and make effective change happen. Therefore, an engineering system
approach bringing together health care providers, policy-makers and business leaders to
work collectively on the U.S. imminent challenges can deliver tremendous value.
1.3 Problem Statement
Quality and costs are the top priorities in the government agenda to revamp the health
care system. This challenge is at the heart of the research question as well, specifically:
"How to improve quality of care while reducing costs in health care?" However, the
essence of the question evolved throughout our research endeavor as we deepened our
knowledge and understanding of the U.S. health care industry. At first, the research
approach focused on leveraging business practices to improve operational efficiencies in
hospitals, for instance practices from manufacturing and high-tech companies that faced
similar challenges to produce high quality products at low cost.
To demonstrate the value of these management principles, we joined a project at a local
hospital in Boston aiming at improving quality and efficiency in the Department of
Anesthesia through the use of new Information Technology tools. As the project
progressed, we realized that the bigger opportunities were available if we considered
system-wide improvements rather than local improvements. The approach to the research
question then broadened to look at how innovation could be fostered within health care to
deliver system-wide improvements.
To this end, we obtained a unique opportunity to join an innovative project at a local
hospital in Boston. This particular effort was interested in launching an entirely new
primary care practice. Given the central role of primary care in the overall delivery of
care, a new primary care practice has the potential to revolutionize the entire U.S. health
care system and to provide system-wide improvements. Informed by this new
development, we reformulated our research question as follows:
"Can a new primary care model be a solution to U.S. health care challenges?"
1.4 Research Approach
To better understand the complexity of the current situation in the U.S. health care, we
conducted a thorough literature review on the health care system, its dynamics, and its
challenges using multiple sources of information. We reviewed publications from large
recognized institutions (World Health Organization, Institute of Medicine, OECD reports,
etc) to gain significant insights into the U.S. health care as well as past initiatives
designed to tackle these already existing challenges. We reviewed articles pertaining to
the importance of primary care and its potential impact on the health care system. In
parallel, we surveyed the literature on innovation from academic journals (Academy of
Health Care Management Journal, Journal of Internal Medicine, etc) and from business
reviews (Harvard Business Reviews, etc). We also leveraged the extensive experience
and knowledge of the Engineering System Division faculty and researchers to learn about
leading management practices and system approaches developed in other industries.
In order to grasp the state-of-the-art in hospitals' practices and particularly in primary
care practice, we conducted informal interviews of medical practitioners to study IT
integration in hospital setting. To understand the business planning challenges and
opportunities in another industry, we undertook a project with a large consumer product
company aiming at helping them improve their strategic planning process.
Finally, as part of a collaborative project with a local hospital in Boston, we contributed
to their endeavor to design an innovative primary care practice. Our role was to build a
simulation model of the future practice. We analyzed and presented the results to
decision-makers to guide in the design of the future practice for optimal operational
efficiency. We also provided medical practitioners' with our vision of innovative
business practices and of design policies critical to the success of the practice. The
project may significantly contribute to alleviate current issues in primary care by
improving both patients' and doctors' satisfaction. If the new care model demonstrates its
value, it can serve as a successful implementation of a disruptive business process
eventually leading to a system-wide adoption and improvement.
1.5 MEHD Group
Throughout my research, I was sponsored by the MEHD research Group (The MIT
Efficient Healthcare Delivery Group), which is a research consortium launched in
Summer 2006 by the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics (CTL) aimed at
driving innovation in healthcare supply chain management. CTL believes that MIT's
considerable expertise in tackling large-scale complex systems will lead to breakthrough
developments in a domain that has traditionally been addressed in operationally focused
and fragmented ways. The mission of The MEHD Group is to envision the future of the
healthcare system and create new knowledge, new technologies, and new business
practices that will help improve healthcare delivery everywhere.
1.6 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we present the fundamental characteristics of the health care industry, and
the specificities of the U.S. health care system in terms of its dynamics and its looming
challenges based on general literature review. Chapter 3 introduces the basic role of
primary care as well as the potential benefits of a strengthened primary care infrastructure
compared to a strengthened specialty care infrastructure. Subsequently, we analyze the
latent positive impact of primary care on U.S. health care challenges. In Chapter 4, we
describe the current crisis in primary care based upon an analysis of financial and
structural incentives of the practice. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the methods and tools to
devise appropriate approaches to revamp primary care. In Section 5.1, we discuss the
case study at a local hospital to help them set up their new primary care. The results are
presented in Section 5.2. Finally, we draw recommendations for policy makers so as to
deliver the promise of a better future health care system in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2: The U.S. Health Care System
In this chapter, we describe the U.S. health care system and its unique attributes. The
description is based on information drawn from different sources of literature so as to
present an objective perspective on health care. An introduction to the uniqueness of
health care and the structure of the U.S. health care system is necessary to understand the
current state of the system and the existing challenges. Various health policies have been
enacted to alleviate these challenges, but none has focused on the structural deficiencies,
possibly due to the long history of the U.S. health care system. We will analyze the
stakeholders and the complex financing mechanisms in U.S. health care market. It will
provide a quick overview of the dynamics of the health care system and present the two
most critical challenges the system is facing: rising health care costs and growing
uninsured individuals.
2.1 Health Care is a Special Industry
Before analyzing the U.S. industry in detail, it is important to outline the differences
between health care viewed as a product and other commodity product. Reviewing the
fundamental differences will help us better understand the health care industry, its
particular dynamics and its profound challenges. This will in turn help us understand the
design of health care delivery supply chain, from money, patients to medical resources.
A definition of Health Care
Health is perhaps the most valuable asset a person has, at least it is a truth revealed during
an episode of illness. Unlike commodity product such as corn, where demand and supply
follow relatively predictable patterns at least in the short-term, there are significant
uncertainties in the demand and supply of health care. Specifically, the delivery process
of health, the effectiveness of health delivery and how much health care is needed for a
particular condition are all unknown to a large extent.
The World Health Organization defines health, as "Health is a state of complete physical
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" 3.
Interestingly enough, in this definition, health includes the notion of welfare in the
comprehensive aspect of care, which goes beyond the simple model of "fixing" a disease,
as is the case for a car repair shop. We can picture the comprehensive definition as a
consumer-focused insurance company, which would perform regular check-ups for the
consumer in order to better guide him into safe and lasting utilization of his car. In
practice, however, the notions of welfare and comprehensiveness are often forgotten. We
have evolved into a society of mass consumption of products and services, where
freedom of choice is key to maximizing personal satisfaction and well-being. Health care
is different; it is a unique type of service that requires an appropriate delivery mechanism.
Guided by the general definition of health, the health care industry has several unique
features. Kenneth Arrow in his 1963 paper described the fundamental differences
between health and the standard definition of a commodity4 . Arrow characterized the
demand for health care as irregular and unpredictable, while being costly to the patient as
it can impair its personal integrity and affect its productivity for an uncertain period of
time. Also, he outlined the expertise and trust driven nature of supply, as provision of
health care requires significant amount of knowledge and involves the central role of trust
in the delivery process.
Uncertainty of a disease condition, non-measurability of the treatment efficacy and
unpredictability of health evolution are inherent characteristics of the health care
industry. It requires health delivery mechanisms to be very adaptive and flexible to deal
with unexpected health problems and health outcomes. There are various types of health
delivery systems. Some delivery mechanisms are tailored to specific conditions,
especially for complex and not well-understood diseases where the source of the disease
has not yet been identified let alone the availability of specific drugs for the treatment.
3Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946)
Arrow, K. J. (1963)
The uniqueness of care delivery is a natural source of inefficiency as it is difficult to
standardize care processes and to benchmark them for higher performance, which is a
common practice in other industries.
New care delivery models
The traditional model of health care delivery, where a patient visits a physician for the
treatment of a specific disease condition once symptoms arise, has evolved into a broad
range of care delivery models due to innovations in medical science. Over time medical
research has enabled better understanding of the onset and the evolution of certain
diseases, which has allowed them to be treated in a standardized fashion. The
improvements in the diagnosis, the treatment and the prevention of these well-understood
diseases have empowered even non-medical staff to deliver reliable diagnosis, treatment
and prevention. Even individuals can take care of their own health using simplified and
robust self-delivery mechanisms.
A "service-driven" care model of medical service could now be designed to treat
patients' latent or non-urgent conditions. It is not driven by the emergence of clear
disease symptoms but by the awareness of something a patient would like to change in
health. Eye or plastic surgery is an interesting example of the progress in medical science
domain. Here the choices are safe and reliable procedures can be performed at the
patient's request. This model has tremendous implications for medical care delivery in
general since it created a whole new medical industry. At the same time, it may have
influenced people's perspective on health care from a service provided out of necessity to
a service provided out of utility.
Many other medical improvements initiated entirely different health care delivery
channels that were based on self-diagnosis, self-treatment and self-prevention. By
educating themselves, consumers are taking decisions on their own health. But the line
between common diseases and complex diseases is blurring as some food or
pharmaceutical companies would sell products claiming health benefits and enabling
consumers to cope with or to help fight complex diseases, such as cancer. Although not
considered as medical drugs, herbal supplements appeal to consumers due to their alleged
health benefits, fighting even cancer5. These practices may mislead consumers since it is
inherently difficult to evaluate the accuracy of health claims made by various products.
There are significant information asymmetries in the health care industry but also high
uncertainty such that assessments of products and services are extremely difficult to
conduct. Monitoring these "consumer-driven" delivery methods is then required to keep
track of the performance, the quality and the costs. This delivery model has also changed
the perception of health.
Complex diseases and chronic diseases are often age related. As the population ages and
the baby-boomers are fast becoming a growing proportion of the population, more
complex diseases and more chronic diseases are bound to surface. Compounding this
factor, when people get older they lose their ability to treat themselves and they are
reluctant to get educated. Suffering different types of diseases, requiring various types of
treatment and lacking the independence to use appropriate treatment process, chronically
ill and elderly patients face significant challenges due to the new care delivery
mechanisms.
2.2 The United States Health Care System
The U.S. health care system is unique in many ways. In other countries, there is generally
a central governmental entity (e.g. Ministry of Health) structuring and financing the
entire health care system to coordinate operations of smaller systems in an orderly
manner. In contrast, the U.S. health care system is highly decentralized and fragmented -
see Figure 1 for a schematic representation of major health care stakeholders. The
subsequent section will describe the fragmentation of the system.
5 "The Growing Case Against Herbs - More Research Questions Safety, Effectiveness" by Chris Adams,
The Wall Street Journal 08/29/2002
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Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Health Care Stakeholders
2.2.1 A Decentralized and Fragmented System
There is no true central entity in charge of orchestrating healthcare delivery and
healthcare financing. This is largely left to the pseudo market forces between large
players in the industry to coordinate the entire system. In that sense, the U.S. can be
deemed to be a market-based system.
This creates significant challenges for the patients since in order to receive care from
providers; one has to deal with separate entities to treat a specific disease. There are no
one-stop solutions in this U.S. health care system. Errors and miscommunications often
result from poor coordination. To get an insurance coverage, to see a medical provider for
diagnosis, to see the referred specialist for optimal treatment while working through
administrative procedures to get reimbursement is particularly challenging for the
chronically ill patients with multiple conditions, as they have to make their way through
this health care maze.
Furthermore, there is no universal coverage in the U.S. and it is the only developed
country in the world, except for South Africa, that does not provide health care for all of
its citizens6. Most people obtain their insurance through their employers, a likely reason
behind the fact that significant proportion of the U.S. population does not have health
insurance coverage. In 2008, the Kaiser Commission reported 45 million uninsured non-
elderly people in the U.S.7. The U.S. healthcare system is driven by private and public
health services, for-profits and non-profits resulting in a multi-payer, multi-state
administrative structure. Given the decentralized structure of the U.S. system, we can
anticipate independent behavior from stakeholders, optimizing locally for their own
benefits.
If the objectives of various stakeholders are not aligned, this structure may lead to a
suboptimal outcome for the entire system. As Jonas et al. pointed out, "it is amazing how
much money and time these other areas of power and control, such as the pharmaceutical
and insurance industries, spend to make sure that the United States does not have a single
national structure for paying for, much less operating, its health care system" .
Proponents of the market based system in the United States argue that it is more efficient
for the development and the diffusion of new technologies while opponents argue that it
is detrimental to most Americans as it creates more inequalities in access, and quality,
leading to a ever struggling health care system.
In a decentralized market-based health care system, every stakeholder is subject to
competition to a certain extent. Based on the classical free market theory, competition
among health care suppliers, providers, health insurance companies should give them
incentives to innovate and provide patients with an array of products and services
allowing them to choose the most appropriate service that meets their needs, expectations
and resources. Healthy competition should force companies to strive for better quality,
cost and service. Nevertheless, Michael Porter et al. outlined that "competition in the
health care system occurs at the wrong level, over the wrong things, in the wrong
6 Ayres (1996)
7Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2008)
8 Jonas (2007)
geographic markets, and at the wrong time." Thus the healthcare system is producing
inefficient outcomes9.
2.2.2 Complex Financing Mechanisms
The cost of health care is borne by a complex combination of patient, employer, provider
(doctors, hospitals) and a third-party payer (private and public insurers) resulting in
convoluted and non-transparent financial streams - see Figure 2. Individuals pay for
healthcare through four main channels:
* government sponsored programs (Medicare, Medicaid or state and federal
programs)
* employment-based health insurance (discounted premiums)
* individual health plans (no benefits from group discounts)
* out-of-pocket expenses
Patients
Payroll taxes Premiums
Taxes subsidized premiu
Health
Government Public payments Insu Payments Employers
Managed care
Fee for service/Negotiated discounts Out-of-pocket expenses
Discounts
Healthcare
providers
Healthcare
Suppliers
Figure 2: Financial Streams in the Health Care System
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
Consequently, we can anticipate heavy procedural burden and high administrative cost to
support the current health care system. Indeed, enormous amount of time, resources and
money are spent to verify eligibility of patients for a specific procedure, to check health
Porter et al. (2004)
benefits in the insurance plan, to calculate coinsurance and deductible, to collect
payments, etc. According to Woolhandler et al., taken together, insurance carriers'
overheads, employers' costs to manage health benefits, hospitals' spending on
administration and physicians' expenses in administration was estimated to account for
31% of US health care expenditures in 1999, when the Canadian health care system spent
half as much in administrative expenses' .
In fact, a single payer system, where the government would cover most of the expenses
incurred by its citizen, would enable dramatic savings on administrative costs. The
administrative savings would probably account for more than $200 billion a year,
exceeding the cost to cover all of the uninsured individuals". However, universal
coverage proposals face tremendous challenges given the aftermath of the Clinton's
health care plan failure as well as the implementation of such a wide initiative in the
context of a financial crisis.
2.3 The U.S. Health Care System Challenges
The U.S. health care system is one the most technologically advanced systems in the
world providing new medical devices and drugs to deal with complex diseases fueled by
the constant innovation brought by biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies. Yet,
the health care system is facing tremendous challenges threatening its long-term
sustainability. Given that the U.S. spends more than any other industrial country on
health care, there is significant debate on the difference in equity and efficiency of health
care as provided and population health outcomes relative to the country's total healthcare
spending. According to the report "Why Not the Best? Results from a National Scorecard
on U.S. Health System Performance" the U.S. ranks at the bottom among industrialized
countries on healthy life expectancy at birth or age 60, and last on infant mortality' 2
Furthermore, there are large discrepancies between medical care access and quality
10 Woolhandler et al. (2003)
1 "One Nation, Uninsured" by Paul Krugman, June 13, 2005 NYTimes
12 The Commonwealth Fund (2006)
across states, regions, hospitals and health plans.
There are two critical issues facing the United States healthcare system that have been
highlighted by both presidential candidates during their campaign in 2008:
* the skyrocketing overall cost of healthcare
* the growing number of uninsured individuals
During the campaign, there was significant debate on how should both issues be
addressed. President Obama planned to address the issue by reforming the health
insurance system while reducing administrative costs with widespread adoption of IT
solutions, which will reduce overall healthcare costs. Senator McCain proposed to
contain rising healthcare costs so as to make health insurance affordable to the most in
need.
2.3.1 Rising Healthcare Costs
In a multi-payer system such as the United States healthcare system, rising healthcare
costs imposes significant burden on every healthcare payer. In 2006, the United States
spent 15.3 percent of its GDP on health care expenditures compared with an OECD
median of 8.7 percent13 . Compounding the already higher expenditures on healthcare,
total healthcare expenditures have been steadily increasing over the past years and are
expected to continue their dramatic increase over the next decade. Projections by the
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services estimated an annual growth rate of 6.6%
through 2017. Given these predictions, health expenditures will grow faster than the US
GDP. In 2007, it grew 1.8% faster than GDP and the United States will spend more and
more of its GDP on healthcare in the future. Containing future healthcare costs is
therefore a top priority for every future government.
2.3.2 Growing Number of Uninsured Individuals
One of the direct consequences of rising healthcare costs is the growing number of
13OECD Health Data 2008
uninsured individuals. An increasing number of people are taking the risk of being
uninsured because health care coverage is too expensive. Some others overestimate their
health or prefer saving money by not having health insurance when they are still young
and healthy. A major consequence of people being uninsured is the higher risk of
bankruptcy. "Every 30 seconds in the United States someone files for bankruptcy in the
aftermath of a serious health problem." 4.
While most developed countries provide partial coverage for health care expenses of their
citizens, there is no universal health insurance coverage in the United States. Individuals'
out-of-pocket payments, private or public insurance policies, or publicly subsidized
charity programs are the channels through which people pay for medical care. Over the
years, insurance premiums have followed health expenditures and increased steadily
making it harder and harder for the government to afford a universal coverage initiative
throughout the country, even growing faster than inflation' 5 .
Employment is central to the United States insurance system. The employer provides
most of the insurance coverage. This employment-based health insurance structure
originates from the post World War II labor conditions where several limitations on
wages forced corporations to offer additional health benefits to their employees to attract
and retain them. Rulings from the US Supreme Court in favor of unions to negotiate
health benefits packages for workers and additional government policies strengthened the
employment-based insurance system with advantageous corporate tax policies' 6 . The
viability of such a system to pay for insurance may be questionable in today's
environment.
There are serious ramifications of the uninsured on the overall U.S. health system and
economy. When uninsured, individuals tend to forego preventive measures or preventive
diagnosis; they have poorer health conditions than insured individuals, leading to worse
14Himmelstein et al. (2005)
15The Factors Fueling Rising Healthcare Costs 2006
16 Thomasson (2003)
overall health outcomes1 7. The Institute of Medicine has analyzed the direct and indirect
consequences of the uninsured individuals on the U.S. health system and economy - see
Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Impacts of the Uninsured on the U.S. System
Source: The Institute of Medicine (2003)
17 The Institute of Medicine (2003)
There are significant external and spillover costs imposed on the system to take care of
the uninsured individuals. Indeed, they diminish the overall quality and availability of
personal health services as they utilize community clinics and hospital emergency rooms.
They also decrease the public health system capacity. As a consequence, there are higher
taxes, budget cuts, and loss of other uses for public revenues diverted to uncompensated
care. General workforce productivity also decreases as a result of overall population
poorer health 8 .
2.4 An Overview of U.S. Health Policy History
Health care challenges have always been a priority on governmental agendas. Various
policies were enacted to contain costs and to improve quality of care. However effectives
these policies were, it is useful to underline the past major health policies that shaped the
current health care system, giving an overview of the current policy landscape.
2.4.1 President Clinton's Healthcare Plan
National health insurance initiatives were on the US political agenda during the late part
of the 2 0th century. In 1994, President Bill Clinton sponsored the Health Security Act,
proposing to achieve universal coverage in the United States. It would have mandated all
employers to provide health insurance to their employees while giving subsidies to small
businesses and unemployed individuals to pay for their medical coverage. The Clinton
plan faced aggressive retaliation from the insurance industry, the business community
and the lobby groups. The insurance industry financed lobbying and advertising
campaign to fight against Clinton's plan19. Facing such an opposition, without the liberal
majority in Congress, the act was sure to be defeated 20. The Clinton's health plan
demonstrated the difficulty to implement universal health coverage in the United States
and significantly deterred further proposals targeted at covering most Americans.
18 The Institute of Medicine (2003)
19 "One Nation, Uninsured" by Paul Krugman, June 13, 2005 NYTimes
20 Oberlander (2002)
2.4.2 Managed Care Organizations Revolution
Another characteristic of the US health care system is the prevalence of managed care
systems. According to Roemer et al., Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) were
promoted by the first Nixon administration (1969-1973) to modify the U.S. health care
delivery system in order to contain health care costs, primarily by reducing
hospitalization 21. Robert G. Shouldice (1991) provides a simple definition of an HMO:
"any organization, either for-profit or nonprofit, that accepts responsibility for providing
and delivering a predetermined set of comprehensive health maintenance and treatment
services to a voluntarily enrolled population for a pre-negotiated and fixed periodic
premium payment".22
Gradually, HMO evolved into Managed Care Organization (MCO), which stress on the
financial management components to better manage patient utilization and provider
practices. Austrin (1999) provides the definition of MCO as a "system that uses financial
incentives and management controls to direct patients to providers who are responsible
for giving appropriate, cost-effective care. Managed care systems are intended to control
the cost of health care by emphasizing prevention, early intervention and outpatient
care" 23
The cost-effectiveness is central to the existence of Managed Care. Their central
objective is to contain costs as much as they can, relying on tight control of resources and
on enrolled patients' choices of providers and practices, generating substantial revenues.
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation report, 93% working Americans not on
Medicare with insurance coverage are enrolled in an MCO through their employer24.
However, there are significant concerns on the real value of managed care organizations
in terms of quality improvements of medical care and its direct implications in terms of
21 Roemer et al. (1973)
22 Shouldice (1991)
23 Austrin (1999)
24 Kaiser Family Foundation (2006)
focusing on cost controls, and subsequently maximizing potential profits. Bodenheimer et
al. observed that primary care gate keeping, which is promoted by managed care and
motivated to reduce patient referrals to reduce costs, is not an adequate system 25.
Immediate consequences of the organization of health care financing and delivery into
MCO are the substantial loss of patient's freedom in providers' choice, the type of
procedures and the loss of convenient access to care. Overall, the managed care
revolution has failed to address the structural issues of the U.S. medical delivery system
by trying to solve it on the sole objective of costs.
2.5 Health Care Cost Drivers Analysis
There are several studies aimed to identify the root causes and the consequences of both
growing healthcare costs and the rising number of uninsured individuals. Governmental
agencies, insurance companies, policy makers as well as the academia are interested in
better understanding the cost drivers to reduce cost of the health care system. Yet, no
systematic and pragmatic approaches are available to address the issues that are
consistent with the analysis.
While there is no clear consensus on the factors fueling costs, the interdependence of
multiple forces obviously increases the difficulty in devising an appropriate course of
action to curb rising health care costs. In this section, we will explain succinctly the
methodologies, assumptions and conclusions of a series of selected studies on health care
costs from various sources that looked at this issue from different perspectives. We will
present a summary of the key factors influencing the increase in health care costs from a
global perspective in an objective manner. Subsequently, we will outline another
segmentation of costs based on its distribution across diseases and population. It will
offer a practical approach to address health care costs: strengthening primary care.
25 Bodenheimer, T. et al. (1999)
2.5.1 Internal and External Drivers of Cost
Thomas Bodenheimer conducted a series of analysis to find a potential explanation to
high and rising health care costs26. His findings concluded that the aging of the
population was not an adequate explanation and neither was the overutilization by the
consumers during the spread of insurance coverage in the 1950's. However, the
incomplete structure of competitive markets in health care may be partially responsible
for high health expenditures. In his second article, he probed the potential health care cost
of innovative technologies 27. He found that technological innovation, in itself, was not
responsible for increased cost as long as it provides benefits to patients, outweighing
costs of care. It is the rapid technological diffusion and the uncontained use of new
devices that is primarily responsible for high and rising costs. A potential solution to this
spiraling trend is to establish strong containment costs measures. However, when looking
at the Canadian system and HMOs in the US characterized by tight budgetary controls,
technological advance is slower to develop but eventually drives costs upward. Another
important source of excessive costs is related to the complex administrative structure of
the U.S. health care system, as discussed earlier.
A study published in the Academy of health care management journal detailed the factors
behind U.S. health care costs28 . The key drivers identified were related to:
* Hospitals emergency rooms' utilization
* Upward pressure on physicians' pays due to cuts on Medicare and litigation
* Increased utilization of prescription drugs
* Rapid development of technology with limited emphasis on cost-effectiveness
* Pressure on nurses' wages due to labor shortage
* Uninsured burden on overall health care costs
2.5.2 Approach to Deal with High Health Care Costs
In 2006, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality published a paper on healthcare
26 Bodenheimer (2005)
27 Bodenheimer (2005)
28 Bolton et al. (2005)
costs segmentation. It revealed an uneven distribution of actual healthcare spending
across individuals, different segments of the population, specific diseases and payers29
They found that in 2002, 5% of the population accounted for almost half (49%) of total
health care expenses while half of the population accounted for only 3%. The 15 most
expensive health conditions account for 44% of total health care expenses. Patients with
multiple chronic conditions cost up to seven times as much as patients with only one
chronic condition. The elderly (age 65 and over) represented 13% of the U.S. population
in 2002, consumed 36% of total U.S. personal health care expenses; they accounted for
43% of the 5% of top spenders.
Chronic conditions also made up for a large proportion of total health care costs. The
major chronic conditions include: mood disorders, diabetes, heart disease, asthma and
hypertension. It is estimated that 25% of the U.S. population have at least one of these
conditions. When other illnesses are counted with these chronic conditions, total
spending of these individuals accounted for 49% of health care cost.
2.5.3 Primary Care to Manage Chronic Illnesses Costs
Chronic care spending is responsible for a large proportion of health care costs and they
are very concentrated in a small segment of the population, especially the elderly since
chronic diseases tend to be age-related. Given these results, the aging of the population
poses a significant threat and expected to exert upward pressure on health care costs. As
it is, the current health care system cannot be sustained in the near future with an already
extremely costly structure and the inadequate insurance coverage. Wagner found that
"chronically ill patients receive limited assistance from their providers in their efforts to
maintain function and quality of life as they cope with their illness", while "practitioners
often fail to assess their patients' understanding of their illness, their ability to function or
their insight into self-management." 30
29 Stanton (2006)
30 Wagner (1997)
Primary care plays a critical role in helping to cope with chronic diseases, as primary care
is the main platform of interaction between patients and medical practitioners. It is
designed to ensure coordination, continuity and effectiveness of care throughout the
episode of illness including chronic diseases.
As Steve Jonas concluded in the section on primary and ambulatory care: "in the U.S. a
disproportionate share of health care resources is devoted to inpatient care, both acute and
long term. If, overall, health care is to be improved, this imbalance needs to be addressed.
Furthermore, given the current profile of disease and disability in the United States, it is
obvious that significant improvements in the health of the American people could be
achieved by the widespread implementation of known health-promotion and disease-
preventive measures in the ambulatory setting. This is the central element of
comprehensive primary care." 31
31Jonas (2007) p 101
Chapter 3: Primary Care: a Solution to U.S. Health
Care Challenges
As we described earlier, there are significant improvements to be made in primary care,
which can contribute to alleviate the U.S. health care challenges. In this section, we
discuss the role of primary care in detail and its potential value as a solution to ailing
problems related to cost and quality of care in the U.S.
3.1 Definition of Primary Care
In the U.S. health care delivery model, primary care is the major point of entry of any
health services. As the first contact between sick individuals and medical services,
primary care physicians have to perform a large number of tasks to best prepare and
guide patients in the flow of care delivery. While it may be difficult to precisely define
the practice of primary care, Grumbach et al. view it as a practice that encompasses a
comprehensive array of services for preventive, acute and chronic needs provided by
personal clinicians who are responsible for the overall ongoing health of their patients32.
Preventive care involves the identification of a patient's current health status and lifestyle
through diagnosis and discussion, and patient education to recommend behavior change
to promote wellness. Acute care, on the other hand, requires an appropriate set of
measures to diagnose patient's condition, the referral to the most relevant specialist(s)
and the coordination of care among other necessary health services. Chronic care entails
regular diagnosis during follow-up visits to check patients' health evolution, ongoing
necessary treatments and procedures, psychological support to ease the burden of chronic
disease, as well as lifestyle counseling or recommendations on how to improve overall
health.
32 Grumbach and Bodenheimer (2002)
Given the centrality of primary care in the healthcare system, it is important to outline the
pivotal role of communication and collaboration between the patient and his primary care
physician. The primary care clinician acts as a personal advisor and a health care
specialist to ensure his patients' well-being, adequate coordination and continuity of care
throughout the episode of illness be it preventive, acute or chronic. Building a strong and
lasting relationship with the patient is thus fundamental to help the patient endure his
illness and to make him comply with recommended care or behavior change. The concept
of the central and comprehensive role of primary care is not new. The major challenge of
primary care is in the implementation of the concept.
In modem practice of primary care, especially in managed care context, the relationship
between primary care physician and his patient is usually neglected. McGinnis et al.
noted that coordination of preventive and curative services ensured by effective primary
care occurs less often than it should in much of American medical practice33 . The reason
being the fanatical emphasis on cost reduction by managed care, since the value of
primary care does not materialized at the time of the visit but throughout the entire length
of the care process. As a result, it is inherently difficult to monetize and then reward
primary care physicians adequately. Compounding this factor is the redefinition of the
role of primary care in the context of managed care. Bodenheimer observed the gate-
keeping role of primary care physicians set by managed care organizations, which is to
reduce patient referrals to specialists in order to reduce costs, is leading to inadequate
practice of care34.
3.2 Value of Primary Care
Primary care holds the key in the coordination and continuity of care. Given the
intangible nature of coordination and continuity, the intrinsic value of primary care
cannot be directly measured and captured using quantitative methods. Schematically, it
McGinnis et al. (2002)
Bodenheimer, T. et al. (1999)
can be viewed as a centerpiece of an interdependent health care system. Good primary
care has positive externalities that benefit the entire system while poor primary care leads
to negative externalities hurting the whole system. By taking a holistic perspective on the
entire health care system to assess the value of primary care, we can capture this "ripple
effect".
3.2.1 Indicators of Health Care System Overall Quality
Drawing on the international comparison of industrialized countries' health care system
overall quality and costs relative to their primary care infrastructures, Starfield & al.
found robust results supporting the value of primary care for the entire system: "the
stronger the primary care, the lower the costs. Countries with very weak primary care
infrastructures have poorer performance on major aspects of health"' 35. Given these
findings, the level and quality of primary care provision in a country can then be key
indicators of a nation's health care system overall quality and costs in the long run.
In the case of the U.S. although the country spends more per capita on health care than
any other industrialized country, it ranked last in a study comparing 10 Western
industrialized nations' primary care system. The ranking criterion includes 12 statistical
measures of national health quality indicators and the overall satisfaction of the
population with their system 36. The data displayed strong correlation between good
primary care system and overall health system performance. It should be noted that the
overall results can be caused by difference in population, types of diseases related to the
country's lifestyle and its environment.
Fragmented and insufficient primary care infrastructure in the U.S. is certainly an
indicator and source of the structural deficiencies in the entire U.S. health care. There is
not, however, enough evidence of the correlation between the current ailing state of the
U.S. health care system and its level of primary care infrastructures. Nonetheless, it can
Starfield and Shi (2002)
36 Starfield (1991)
be derived from several studies that the U.S. lacks a strong and robust primary care
practice compared to its industrialized peer countries that is deemed to be a key
characteristic of a high quality and low cost health care system. Therefore, significant
improvements on the quality of the overall health delivery system in the U.S. may
materialize if primary care is strengthened.
3.2.2 Improvements in Mortality Outcomes and Costs
There is an increasing body of research focused on evaluating the impact of primary care
on health outcomes and costs within a nation so as to identify the intrinsic value of
primary care. For instance, a study led by Shi et al. assessed the relationship between
health outcomes and physician supply over 4 separate five-year periods across states in
the U.S. 37 It found that an increase in the primary care physicians-to-population ratio was
associated with a decrease in mortality, the same conclusion was drawn for family
physicians. Conversely, an increase in specialist physician-to-population ratio was
associated with higher mortality. However, it is interesting to note that an increase in the
ratio of primary care physician-to-population does not necessarily guarantee a
proportionate increase in primary care access or better delivery. Primary care physicians
supply is as important as the delivery channel by which primary care reaches out the
population in need.
Another study led by Baicker & al. analyzed quality of care and Medicare spending
across states. They observed that: "states where more physicians are general practitioners
show greater use of high-quality care and lower cost per beneficiary. Conversely, states
where more physicians are specialists have lower-quality care and higher cost per
beneficiary" 38 . Even across states, we can observe difference in terms of quality and costs
associated with difference in primary care level of infrastructure and access. These
studies show the correlation between strong primary care and high quality and low-cost
care delivery. Although, the studies do not demonstrate direct causation of primary care
Leiyu Shi et al. (2003)
38 Baicker and Chandra (2004)
delivery efficiency, higher quality, and lower cost of care, there is a growing consensus
on the value of primary care and its direct impact on health outcomes. Real applications
of primary care reinforcement initiatives would help test the hypothesis of the value of
primary care and would promote action across the country.
Potential solutions to the ailing U.S. health system can also be examined in other
directions than primary care as well. Specialists can also contribute in the care of chronic
diseases. For instance, expanding current supply of specialists trained to cope with
chronic care may be a solution. Yet, a study reviewed available publications to evaluate
the alternative solution of specialists or disease management programs taking care of
chronic diseases and it showed no superiority of the alternatives to primary care39
3.2.3 Importance for Chronic Disease Management
Strong primary care seems to be a logical way to manage chronic diseases for better
diagnosis, better monitoring, better counseling on lifestyle change and better referral to
specialist. It is also a solution to prepare for the rapid shift from acute diseases to chronic
diseases caused by the aging of the population and unhealthy lifestyles. All in all, strong
primary care offers a robust approach to health care given the current and future
challenges the U.S. is facing.
3.3 Primary Care Crisis
While the U.S. needs to rely more heavily and to strengthen its primary care, the practice
is facing its own crisis and is on the verge of collapse as more and more medical school
students are abandoning internal medicine even though its demand is growing rapidly.
Primary care practice in the United States is struggling. Obtaining an appointment with a
primary care physician has become a daunting task across the United States. General
Rothman and Wagner (2003)
medicine practices are almost shut down in both the University of California San
Francisco General Hospital and the Massachusetts General Hospital 4 .
How did the system arrive at this stage? Over the last few years, the situation in primary
care has been exacerbated by the growing lack of primary care physicians combined with
the rising demand for primary care. Now, scenarios of total collapse of primary care
practice, where no primary care physician would be available, are possible. Given the
time required to train a qualified primary care physician and the time to build effective
relationship with patients, every stakeholder involved in the health care system should
urgently act constructively and effectively. With primary care being the backbone of the
entire healthcare system, policy makers and hospitals managers must work together and
renew the primary care delivery model41 .
Recently a roundtable was held on primary care redesign where four experts in primary
care discussed the current crisis in primary care and key elements to consider in the
future of the practice. Dr. Thomas Lee observed, "there are too many patients, too many
demands, too much information flowing through, too little time to do a good job.' 4 2
There are 3 major factors that have an impact on the shortage of primary care physicians,
namely money, prestige and controllable lifestyle.43
The roundtable of experts fostered discussion around the key factors leading to the
current primary care crisis. To this end, we built a system dynamics model to capture the
essential variables involved in the system's crisis. This model was developed based on
literature review on primary care crisis and interviews with primary care practitioners.
The presence of reinforcing and feedback mechanisms responsible for the current crisis in
primary care is easily captured by the model logic. We do not intend to develop a
quantitative model to simulate the system for the lack of precise data regarding the
qualitative influencing factors.
40 The Watcher's World Blog (07-20-2008)
41 Bodenheimer (2006)
42 Lee et al. (2008)
43 Lee et al. (2008)
As part of further research projects, we suggest the development of a more detailed
system dynamics model in order to assess the impact and effectiveness of policy actions.
Nevertheless, the causal loop diagram is an effective tool to better grasp the current
situation in primary care and sum up key factors to convey effective ideas to policy-
makers and hospitals' decision-makers.
The following schema was developed iteratively with medical practitioners, particularly
primary care physicians, at a local hospital in Boston area.
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Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram of the Primary Care Crisis
Chapter 4: Analysis of Primary Care
Dynamics
In this chapter, we explore the dynamics driving primary care practice crisis. First, we
draw on basic literature on economics of incentives to better understand financial
incentives of primary care physicians and the associated difficulty in designing
appropriate contracts. Second, we review the structural incentives associated with the
work environment and work lifestyle. Given these considerations, we obtain a better
overview of primary care practice with which we can generate insights to devise targeted
and appropriate policies to tackle primary care challenges and improve U.S. health care.
4.1 Incentives Analysis
To analyze financial incentives in primary care settings, we draw on classical theory of
principal-agent problem, or agency theory, which studies the problems associated with
rational agents under contractual agreements. To give a simple representation of the
situation, a principal wants to achieve a certain objective but cannot do it by himself, so
he pays an agent to do the job. Agency theory studies the rational behavior of the agent
under such contract, problems of information asymmetry associated with the contract and
contract design.
4.1.1 Basic Financial Incentive Schemes
There are three major basic payment schemes (linear compensation formulas) in health
care settings that are also widely used in other industries, namely salary, fee for service
and capitation. Under these different payment schemes offered by the principal, a rational
agent may rationally act differently. The outcomes can be optimal or can deviate from the
principal's intended objective depending on the type of task to be performed and the
design of the payment contract.
Salary
Salary corresponds to the straight payment of a pre-determined level of compensation
agreed by both the agent and the principal. The level of compensation is fixed and not
linked directly to any particular performance measure. Therefore, salary is said to have
weak financial incentive because it has no direct effect on the productivity or on specific
tasks desired by the principal. Given the insensitiveness of salary to productivity, the
agent may be more sensitive to non-financial incentives. The scheme can be then
combined with other types of incentives, related to the job design for instance, to
influence behaviors in a more appropriate manner.
Capitation
Capitation represents the payment scheme where the agent's payment is related to the
total number of patients served by the agent. From the agent's perspective, maximizing
monetary payment is equivalent to maximizing patient served. It ties the agent's total
future payment to his ability to attract the largest number of clients possible and to his
capability to churn them out at the fastest speed possible. Depending on the principal's
objective, it can lead to optimal or detrimental behaviors. In the case of simple,
standardized processes with low variability, maximizing throughput can motivate the
agent to devise innovative means to improve processing times for faster turnover. When
the variability in patient conditions is high and tasks to be performed complex, it may
lead to a selective behavior from the agent, which corresponds to the agent avoiding
difficult and long cases to keep simple and faster ones. The agent then transfers
responsibility of treating complex cases to other agents that follow his work in the service
delivery chain.
Fee for service
Fee for service is another payment scheme where the agent is rewarded according to the
type of service provided to the patient. Fee for service ties payment streams with specific
set of tasks delivered by the agent. Intuitively, it is designed to reward the agent with
bonuses for complex tasks. Therefore, it works particularly well in specialty shops where
customized work has to be done for a specific client with specific needs. However, when
the client does not know what his needs are, there are incentives for the agent to perform
additional but unnecessary tasks so as to maximize payments.
4.1.2 Alternative Payment Methods
Information asymmetry is central in the deviation of behavior from optimal behaviors
envisioned when a payment structure is designed. In health care, it is particularly difficult
because there is uncertainty both in the patient's condition and in the medical delivery
process and there are information asymmetries at multiple levels: between the patient and
the doctor, between the patient and the insurance company, between the doctor and the
medical provider structure, between the medical provider structure and the insurance
company covering the patient.
Building on these basic payment schemes and information asymmetries, we can think of
more complicated payment design to strengthen incentives on specific tasks rather than
others. They can link rewards with pre-defined performance measures tied with specific
outcomes. However, there are several disadvantages in this customization of payment
structures and incentives.
Obviously, there are costs associated with the measurement of the defined performance
criteria. Gathering data requires resources in terms of personnel, technology, process and
time. The associated benefits of agents' performance do not necessarily offset the
additional administrative costs of complex contracts. Also, the complexity of payment
structures tends to result in a lack of visibility in the objectives of both the principal and
the agent, diluting the value of overall incentives. A complex contract may be difficult to
be understood and to administer. Simple contracts are often more effective than complex
ones.
4.1.3 Factors to Consider in Payment Design
Thinking that the exact behavior of an agent under a specific contract is predictable is
misleading since unexpected outcomes will certainly arise when implementing a complex
payment scheme. There is no silver bullet in payment structures that would achieve
precisely what the principal intended nevertheless there are schemes, in which the basic
behaviors are quite well understood. When designing a complex or hybrid payment
structure, there are several other factors that should be considered for the payment
scheme to be as effective as hoped. We will not provide an exhaustive list of factors to
include in the design of incentives but present a short discussion of key ones along with
the well-known impacts of these factors and how to approach the design of payment
incentives for primary care physicians.
Risk aversion
The question of risk aversion arises when the agent's future financial payments fluctuate
according to certain performance measures. These performance measures may be
influenced by other factors beyond the agent's control. Depending on the controllability
of these performance measures, or the signal-to-noise ratio, the agent would prefer a
straight salary to a variable payment structure. Then, the principal has to pay a risk
premium to the agent so as to cover for the variability of payments. The optimality of the
contract depends on the extent to which some outcomes are controlled by the agent's
efforts.
Distortion
In many cases, it is not possible to measure the principal's objective directly. Therefore,
firms use an alternative performance measure serving as a proxy for the principal's end
objective. However, the main issue in designing incentives tied to this alternative
performance measure is the divergence between the alternative performance measure and
the principal's objective, i.e. distortion in measures.
Multi-tasking
Often the principal desires multiple tasks to be performed by the agent. The range of
tasks adds to the complexity in incentives design. It can lead the agent to over invest time
to perform one specific task while under investing in others if incentives are structured in
such a way to favor one task over the others.
4.1.4 Principles of Payment Schemes Design
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) identified four basic principles in compensation design
laying the ground for incentives design based on intensity of incentives and risk
tradeoffs44.
Informativeness Principle
Given the lack of perfect information measures, the principle states that compensation
formula design should select performance measures that reduce the error in estimating
agent's efforts and rejecting those that increase estimation error. An application of this
principle is the use of comparative performance evaluation, as comparison with similar
agents removes common exogenous noise.
Incentive-Intensity Principle
The principle states that optimal intensity of incentives should consider four factors: the
incremental profits created by additional effort, the precision of performance
measurement, the agent's risk tolerance and the agent's responsiveness to incentives,
which is associated with the agent's discretion about work aspects (pace, tools, methods,
etc).
Monitoring-Intensity Principle
The principle states that when incentive intensity in an optimal contract is high, the
principal should pay to measure performance carefully.
Equal Compensation Principle
When the agent has two tasks to perform and the principal cannot monitor the allocation
of time or attention, the principle states that two activities valued equally by the principal
should have equal incentive intensity.
44Milgrom and Roberts (1992)
There are further developments of Milgrom and Roberts' principles in incentives design
to include notions of scale, alignment and distortion in performance measures, as follows.
Balanced incentives in scale and alignment45
Robert Gibbons (1998) outlines the importance of scale and alignment of alternative
performance measures with desired outcomes materialized by outputs in the design of
payment contracts. Alignment corresponds to correlation between measured outcomes
and desired outcomes. Scale corresponds to the level of impact of the alternative measure
on the desired outcome. Optimal incentives contract should consider more balanced
incentives in both scale and alignment of the performance measures.
Low distortion and low risk46
Baker (2002) explains the notion of distortion, which corresponds to the correlation of the
effects of the agent's actions on measured outcomes with the effects on the true
objectives. It underlines the existence of some performance measures that can be
manipulated by the agent to fulfill measures outcomes while not achieving desired
objectives. For instance, in a relative performance evaluation scheme, if a CEO's
compensation depends on the benchmark of his company with a selected set of
companies and he can affect the results of the benchmark, the performance measure is
distorted. He concludes that the objective of an optimal incentive system design is to
discover and create low distortion and low risk performance measures.
4.2 Primary Care Job Structure
The current crisis in primary care sheds light upon critical features of job designs that
should be reconsidered. In shaping a new and effective model for primary care, careful
consideration should be given to financial and non-financial incentives design.
45 Gibbons (1998)
46 Baker (2002)
4.2.1 Financial Structure of Primary Care
To be consistent in the payment structure, we have to align tasks performed by 
a primary
care physician with adequate incentive schemes. First, we categorize chronic diseases
according to their characteristics and their requirement of doctors' expertise based 
on
Clayton Christensen's segmentation as shown in Figure 547
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Christensen segments chronic diseases along to two dimensions. The first dimension
corresponds to the immediacy of the consequences of the patients' actions, and 
the
second dimension is the importance of behavioral change in the care process. 
The top of
the quadrant represents chronic diseases with immediate consequences. Therefore
patients are directly motivated to take actions on their health once diseases are 
diagnosed.
The bottom of the quadrant represent chronic conditions that bear consequences 
in the
Clayton Christensen et al. (2008)
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long run, therefore they are significantly dependent on a patient's effort over time to
behave as prescribed.
Based on this segmentation, we can develop a more effective description of primary care
physicians' job. We can then design incentives system rewarding these jobs to improve
quality of care while controlling costs. There are two phases in the chronic care delivery
process: diagnosis and recommendation (prescription and/or behavior change
counseling).
Diagnosis
As technology progresses, diagnosis are becoming increasingly accurate. However, the
physician is still responsible for the final decision. As a matter of fact, the current reward
system tends to favor type I errors (labeling a well person sick) over type 2 errors
(labeling a sick person well) 48. Indeed, punishments for type 2 errors are real: guilt,
embarrassment and the threat of lawsuit. Conversely, type 1 errors are often considered
as "sound clinical practice" or conservative.
Given the continual improvement of diagnosis capabilities, diagnosis will become more
precise, leaving less room for misdiagnosis. In this case, type 1 errors in the decision to
diagnose may be preferable to type 2 errors in terms of quality of outcomes, as diagnosis
will reveal the error. At the same time, health care providers are becoming increasingly
cost-conscious and they are concerned about the over-utilization of costly technological
diagnosis procedures. Therefore, a well-balanced payment system should not reward type
1 errors without imposing additional burden on type 2 errors. For instance, a payment
stream tied to the number of diagnosis but only the ones that revealed a problem can be
an effective payment design. An alternative could be delivered by technological progress
in decision support system, which would help identify appropriate decision for diagnosis
based on a thorough and rules-based assessment of symptoms.
48 Kerr (1975)
Recommendation
Prescription: If a chronic disease has been identified and belongs to the top quadrant, i.e.
the consequences of the patient's actions are immediate. Then the primary care
physician's role is to prescribe the correct medication list or appropriate course of action
the patient has to follow to treat his condition. Further monitoring will be needed to
follow the patient's status. Since the consequences of actions are immediate, the patient
will most likely comply with the prescription. In this case, the primary care physician
does not add substantial value to the care process. A payment design based on fee-for-
service can achieve the intended behavior.
Behavior change counseling: In the case of a chronic condition belonging to the lower
quadrant, the consequences of actions are remote in time. The primary care physician has
then a substantial role to play in the care process of the patient. There should be careful
consideration of the alignment of incentives for the doctor to be rewarded for the
patient's wellness.
In the current managed care organization era, primary care physicians are paid by
capitation to keep a tight control on cost. They are not rewarded for ensuring continuity
and coordination of care. Continuity of care requires extensive communication with the
patient to build a close relationship with the patient throughout repeated visits to perform
accurate diagnosis, to provide personal guidance on disease management and to ensure
behavior changes to name a few tasks required to adequately serve a patient.
Coordination of care requires extensive knowledge of diseases and up-to-date treatment
procedures to best reorient patients' to specialists. Most of these tasks are not on the fee
schedule of primary care physicians paid on fee-for-service let alone on a capitation
contract.
4.2.2 Structural Incentives of the Practice
The effects on the overall practice of primary care can be segmented into two separate
categories: the effects on the medical students that chose to go into primary care career
and the effects on the primary care physicians that leave the practice, either for retirement
or for a career change to other specialty or for part-time work. According to a study on
factors impacting career choice in primary care practice, income, working hours and loan
repayment had significant influence on some students' choice to go into non-primary care
specialties49. Both incoming primary care physicians and general physicians are affected
by the job design either for the structural specificities or financial schemes.
Complex and variable tasks
A primary care physician has to perform various tasks ranging from administrative tasks
to completing patient information, filing prescription forms, identifying relevant
information from patient's family to forming an accurate judgment on the patient current
state of health. As argued above, multi-tasking has been a problem in the design of
financial incentives to achieve optimal behavior from primary care physician. Job design
can help solve the issue of multi-tasking. Since medical doctors do not achieve their
highest potential while working on certain tasks, for example resolving administrative
issues, such tasks could be performed by medical assistant or even nurses, leaving health
related tasks to medical doctors as they are the critical resources in primary care practice.
Schedules
The preeminence of managed care organizations had the effect of restricting patient face
time to increase throughput and increase overall utilization of expensive resources. The
effect on physician workload and lifestyle has been deleterious. In current primary care
practices, visits are constrained to either 15 minutes or 30 minutes slots per patient. It is
far from enough to review all relevant information to make appropriate decisions let
alone to build a decent relationship with the patient during the scheduled visit. Now,
primary care physicians are under administrative pressure to finish their tasks, leaving a
sense of dissatisfaction and frustration in their job executed in urgency and subsequently
of poor quality.
Rosenthal et al. (1994)
Teamwork
Given the hectic lifestyle of primary care physicians, medical doctors tend to adapt their
schedule to accommodate their private life. There is no defined care team to take
responsibility of a patient. It is creating problem since working part time or taking leave
is becoming increasingly common in primary care practice. Due to the tedious nature of
primary care, team building is hampered and efficient teamwork is difficult given the lack
of familiarity and communication. Teamwork conditions also impact physicians' job
satisfaction.
4.2.3 Medical Training Implications
As discussed earlier, loan repayment is one of the factors influencing career choice of a
physician. Hence, if we want to attract more students towards the primary care route,
there should be adjustments on the prospective salaries in primary care compared to
salaries in specialty practices as primary care providers generally earn less than
specialists. A net budget adjustment, which corresponds to decreasing specialists' salaries
in oversupplied fields to finance an increase in primary care physicians' salaries, could
help attract students in primary care. However, there should be careful analysis of the
current state of the system and shortage of skills, both in primary care and specialty care.
Incentives for primary care practice should be balanced enough not to deter too many
students from specializing.
In line with this objective to mitigate primary care physicians' shortage by considering
mild incentives, a financial subsidy to students going into primary care practice can be
offered. For instance, a financial aid or bonus program could be set up to compensate
medical students for entering primary care training, giving them access to a special loan
repayment assistance. It will help medical students to make their career choice based
upon their career goals and their intrinsic motivation rather than future cash flows.
For non-financial incentives designed to attract students in primary care, career prospects
in primary care and prestige of primary care practice can be enhanced in academic
settings by offering a prestigious prize or award to recognize primary care physicians for
their outstanding achievement and contribution to health care improvement. It will attract
inherently motivated students concerned about taking a path that can be fulfilling and
rewarding in terms of image and prestige.
Selecting motivated primary care physicians gives more "flexibility" in the design of the
fee schedule, as an adequate job design will rely less on financial incentives. The main
idea is to limit financial incentive as it can distract some physicians in the profession by
redirecting focus on maximizing financial returns. This is particularly relevant in primary
care, where collaboration with care team and the relationship with patients are far more
important to quality of care than in other practices having greater procedure-focused.
Drawing on an analogy of primary care practice and non-profit organizations, where
outputs and contributions are difficult to measure, there are two ways to optimally reward
a good quality behavior. One way is to design a set of low distortion / low risk
performance measures (as explained in the previous section), a second by selecting
people based on their intrinsic motivation in the job provided the value and the vision of
the profession are clearly stated50 . Therefore, financial incentives should be considered
with great care in primary care setting compared to specialty practices. Non-financial
incentives work more effectively when people have a sense of mission and a higher
vision than looking at financial returns over the years. It is particularly the case in
primary care in today's world, as students entering the practice are taking on this path for
the purpose and the experience in the practice rather than financial returns alone.
However, just as there is a concern for sustained high productivity in non-profit
organizations since there is a lack of monitoring and limited downside payments for poor
performance, intrinsic motivation and job prestige should be considered simultaneously
so as to attract the right people in primary care.
4.2.4 Payment Design Implications
In "The theory and practice in the design of physician payment incentives", Robinson
Baker (2002)
recommends blended methods that would build upon capitation and add-in fee-for-
service carve outs to reward certain behaviors and tasks essential for a high quality
primary care51. It is fundamentally hard to design an ideal payment scheme that would
reward primary care physicians in such a way that it would maximize quality of care
while containing costs for two reasons. First of all, it is simply difficult to assess the
range of tasks to be performed in primary care settings. Secondly, it is even more difficult
to identify the tasks that contribute to higher quality and lower cost of care.
Robinson also underlines the fact that the widespread adoption of capitation payment
structure for primary care physicians has lead to successful cost containment. However,
the insensitivity of capitation to variations overcompensate narrow practice and under-
reward broad scope of practices. In the extreme case, it may lead to converting primary
care physicians into triage agents. This is a clear example of how poor design payment
scheme can be detrimental.
Quality of care in primary care settings is related to patients' health outcomes, which
depends on several factors, in particular the physician's ability to build a lasting
relationship with the patient to enable effective recommendations on future course of
actions and guiding the patient to appropriate specialists. Indeed, continuity and
coordination of care are generally functions that primary care has to perform well in order
to ensure higher quality of care delivery in a health care system. To compound the
difficulty of payment incentives design, not only does the design have to consider cost
containment but it also has to evaluate the produced outcomes. Cost-effective utilization
of resources for obtaining desired outcomes should be always thought out upfront in the
incentives design. Given the qualitative nature of most proxy variables of quality, we
have to think of alternative measures. We discuss a few such measures below.
Patients' health outcomes
A primary care physician often manages a panel comprising certain patients with multiple
and complex conditions. There is high degree of uncertainty about these patients' current
Robinson (2001)
health condition and about the efficacy of available methods to treat their conditions.
Therefore it is very risky to tie financial returns on such patients' health outcomes. Given
the uncertainty about health outcomes and the interdependence of factors, exogenous and
endogenous, influencing health outcomes, primary care physicians can be averse to the
risks involved in a variable payment scheme based on health outcomes.
Patient satisfaction
Primary care physicians can be rewarded based on patient satisfaction in order to
emphasize the importance of the relationship built with the patient. However, this
alternative performance measure is highly subjective and risky due to the high variation
in health treatments. This alternative measure is also a distorted measure as physician can
alter his standard practice to avoid any practice beneficial to the patient but involving
painful episode of care.
Risk adjusted care
Age and disease categories based segmentation to reward primary care physicians who
are taking care of certain types of patients seem to promise adequate rewards for
complicated procedures and complex tasks required to treat most difficult cases.
However, the difference between treating "complex" cases and treating "simple" cases
should be well calibrated according to the amount of effort spent to take care of those
cases. A proxy variable measuring effort could be time spent to see a specific patient the
amount of resources seized or the frequency of visits for instance.
Relative comparison
Since primary care physicians work with different panel groups of population having
unique set of characteristics, comparing performances between different primary care
physicians does not remove the common noise related to primary care profession to
assess higher productivity, higher quality of care between physicians.
4.2.5 Job Design Implications
Given the complexity of tasks and the difficulty to tie high quality of care with
undistorted measures, designing optimal financial incentive is challenging. Therefore,
primary care job design plays a significant role in the productivity, quality and cost-
effectiveness of the practice. We should learn from the current primary care crisis that
has demonstrated the limits of the prevailing model and highlighted the importance of the
job environment. We can draw conclusions on basic design features and reconsider the
design to launch a new practice. Specifically, appointment schedules may have to be
extended in order for the physician to have time to perform correctly his tasks to take care
of his patients. Flexibility of lifestyle should be incorporated in the design of the job to
allow control of working hours and vacations without disrupting too greatly the
operations of the practice. In this redesign process, teamwork has a unique role.
When pondering on the teamwork environment and on how team can increase the
flexibility of medical doctors work, it requires rethinking of the role of medical assistant,
care coordinator and nurses in the care process. Indeed, assistants can easily perform
certain tasks, thereby giving the doctor more time to focus on "value added" tasks. A
team will act as a single care provider, where the patient contact is the care team. In the
mean time, we have to ensure that it does not affect the quality of primary care practice.
In order for this change to happen, there will have to be involvement of the government
in changing policies regarding training, certification and recruitment of medical assistant,
care coordinator and nurses.
4.3 Conclusions
We reviewed the theory of incentives design and the structure of primary care practice,
which suggested a significant redesign of the type of tasks a primary care physician is
required to perform effectively. A redesign of the training of care teams operating in
primary care should be considered in order to relieve work from medical doctors and
improve quality. In some cases, the tasks are very straightforward and can be easily
managed by trained medical assistants. Such an initiative is of course subject to
regulation on medical practice in terms of qualification, certification and liability. Yet,
we think that physicians' should focus on real value added tasks. Additionally, while
attempting to apply the principles in physicians' payment schemes, we offer two
approaches to primary care physicians' job redesign:
* The first approach consists of defining metrics with both low distortion and low risk
to measure quality of care associated with primary care physician work along the
dimensions of continuity and coordination of care. At the same time, an evaluation of
the effect on total cost should be done that result in motivating physicians to be cost-
efficient. To this end, pilot projects in practical settings should be conducted to
monitor and track behaviors of primary care physicians under different payment
contracts.
* The second approach is to design a payment scheme based upon minimal financial
incentives (salary), which is associated with a selection effect of primary care
physicians for their intrinsic motivation. Concurrently, job design should be
emphasized to offer a better workplace and a flexible schedule for primary care
physicians.
Chapter 5: Redefining Primary Care
Primary care practice and its role in the collaboration and coordination of health care
services resemble the relationships between suppliers and retailers in an industrial
ecosystem. Collaboration and coordination are hard to measure quantitatively but they
can create significant value for businesses if utilized carefully. For instance, Toyota
pioneered the importance of lasting and strong relationship of automotive manufacturers
with suppliers and retailers52. Toyota redefined the way businesses used to operate and
redesigned relationships contracts to be more transparent and long-term focused. The
main idea is that lasting and sound relationship will create more value for the entire
supply chain including suppliers, manufacturers, retailers and customers. In line with
these principles, health care services should consider the practices leveraged by Toyota to
unlock intangible benefits from collaboration and coordination.
Following this analogy, governments and businesses should plan to work together to
create an environment where medical providers can experiment and develop innovative
care model solutions and initiate a breakthrough in health care, especially in primary
care.
5.1 Redefining Primary Care: Business Innovation
New business models are emerging that can potentially disrupt primary care and facilitate
its transition into a new care model that delivers higher value and lower costs.
Concurrently, new technology can also spur the innovation in care models of primary
care models. An effective way to reconsider the primary care practice would be to think
along the categories defined by Christensen as discussed earlier.
52 Womack et al. (1991)
Technological innovation
Point of care technology
Researchers are pushing to develop new diagnosis technologies. New tools and
techniques have emerged in the health care market, which enable medical practitioners to
perform various laboratory tests directly on site. This has eliminated the need for the
patient to schedule two separate appointments: the first one to take the test and the second
one to see the medical practitioner again with the results. Such a change has significant
impact on the primary care practice, as doctors will be able to perform tests and have
immediate access to the results. With the associated increase in operational efficiency,
new technologies will improve the care delivery chain allowing the primary care
physician to focus on real value added care processes.
Information technology
Information technology is the key enabler of effective coordination of care. Increasing
digitization of patient health record and the ability to exchange information will easily
enable care providers to recommend better course of action to patients and integrate
decision support tools to assist medical doctors in their decisions. Also, the use of new
technologies will allow medical practitioners to deliver care remotely thereby increasing
the accessibility of health care.
Business model innovation
The emergence of retail clinics
A new channel of care delivery model is emerging, known as retail clinics. Retail clinics
are small facilities usually present inside a discount retailer, offering convenient access to
primary care service for a limited set of diseases. A nurse practitioner is trained to take
care of patients in a very standardized and rapid fashion. All in all, retail clinics are
increasing the accessibility, the convenience and the affordability of primary services. It
intends to disrupt primary care practice in hospitals so as to "outsource" what can be
done easily, more efficiently and cost effectively, elsewhere. However, instead of directly
displacing the low-end segment of primary care services, retail clinics mostly serve
patients who do not have a primary care physician53
The emergence ofpatient networks
For behavior-dependent diseases, medical compliance and personal counseling are
critical to the care process. Yet, the patient is left unsupported to comply and to follow
often-unclear guidelines given by medical practitioners, since most of the time visits are
either too short in length or far apart. It is inherently difficult to monitor and to advise
patients appropriately. With the emergence of chronic patients networks, a patient can
easily get access to resources to learn about his condition and learn about the behavior
change pathway with the help of experienced patients sharing their experience. Such
networks have a powerful effect on compliance as patients can get access to numerous
resources specifically targeting their conditions, exchange information and experience
with other individuals suffering from the same disease and know appropriate course of
action to take care of themselves 54. It serves the purpose of providing continuity of care
and behavior counseling usually performed by the primary care physician, and it works
particularly well with chronic diseases that are behavior-dependent conditions whose
consequences are immediate.
5.2 Redefining Primary Care: a Hospital Case Study
A local hospital in Boston recently launched an initiative to revamp its primary care
practice. It is a real world, small-scale experiment to test the effectiveness of a new care
model centered on the patient's experience with primary care teams. The objective is to
change the way primary care currently operates. Not only does the practice attempt to
introduce new technologies from point of care diagnosis tools to web-based interactive
platform but it also emphasizes on care processes and services enhancing continuity and
53 Mehrotra et al. (2008)
54Sean O'Meara, "Diabetes Education Goes Multimedia", Nurses World, May 2007
coordination of care. Through this initiative, the hospital intends to demonstrate the value
of primary care and its impact on the quality and cost of care.
As discussed earlier, this experiment complements the theoretical foundations of the
academia and medical practitioners on the value of primary care. Few hospitals have tried
to launch a large-scale initiative on primary care because they either the lack funding for
new technologies or they are already overwhelmed by demand leaving no room to
experiment. Boston area is particularly fertile for innovation in health care as it is a
breeding ground for technology innovators, business experts and medical leaders that can
build constructive innovative initiatives.
Given the innovative aspect of the initiative, careful considerations of the future practice
design before its implementation is key to ensure the success of the practice without too
much rework. Alignment of the new practice's strategy, organization, processes, people,
technologies and metrics is critical. Just as any corporate strategic move, the care
elements of planning have to perfectly fit together to deliver a successful model for
primary care.
5.2.1 Study Objectives
To best serve the purpose of the new practice, it is critical to learn as much as possible
from prevailing best practices in terms of business process planning before the
implementation phase of the project. Many businesses, such as IBM, Nokia or Toyota,
have successfully undergone dramatic changes in their business model to compete
successfully in turbulent times. Decision-makers are better served if they get a better
sense of the new system behavior before the project is physically launched. To this end,
simulation tools can be useful to bring about useful insights.
We worked on this project from January 2009 to May 2009. The main objective of the
simulation study is to provide project managers with operational insights on the likely
behavior of the new primary practice. Other associated objectives that can help decision-
makers in the design of the practice include the assessment of the feasibility of the
initiative, the evaluation of the performance of new practice such as open access
schedule, the assessment of required staffing for the care team depending on the panel of
patients.
5.2.2 Study Approach
We built a simulation model to represent the future state of the practice. We chose a
discrete-event simulation software package, Arena, for the project. The Arena software
package is one of the most suitable software for this study as it provides a user-friendly
interface with advanced modeling modules. It also offers convenient tools to analyze
output data.
We started with a base model replicating the mental representation of the practice using
simplifying assumptions on care processes and service times. Thereafter by working
closely with practice leaders, we fostered constructive debates to challenge the model's
assumptions. It was an insightful exercise as it helped medical practitioners to structure
their plan of daily work and envision the future of the practice in a concrete way. We then
iteratively refined the model based on their comments.
As we calibrated and validated the model for the new practice, we tested various
scenarios to assess the impact of different practice policies. The project team created
different scenarios to study the behavior of the system. For instance, we defined different
input design variables related to the number of visits by visit type, the complexity of
patients by visit type, the number of resources allocated in the new practice, the service
times of care processes and the time period. Depending on the significance of the impacts
of these variables on the system, we drew insights on critical variables that are crucial for
decision-makers and designers.
As part of the learning potential of the simulation study, we are also training the project
team to use the scenario analysis module for them to customize the scenarios they want to
test and to obtain useful results subsequently.
5.2.3 Model Description
Patient types
As an experimental effort, the new practice will recruit a certain patient panel 
with
specific disease profile. Since the practice will start its operations with a new set 
of
patients panel, we will model three different types of visits, namely new visits 
for patients
who have just enrolled in the practice, follow-up visits for established patients and
unexpected visits. The new practice will begin with a ramp-up phase. During the 
first
months of the practice, there will be only new visits then follow-up visits will gradually
increase. After most of the patients in the panel are enrolled, the practice will only 
have
follow-ups visits. A schematic representation of the ramp-up phase of the practice 
is
given in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Ramp-up of The New Practice
From modeling perspective, we are particularly interested in the second period 
with the
mix of new visits and follow-up visits while accommodating flexible time for unexpected
visits. Furthermore, we defined various levels of complexity of patients' health 
status to
refine the segmentation of visit types. A segmentation based on types of diseases 
may not
be relevant because patients often have more than one type of condition, i.e.
comorbidities. Based on our discussion with the care team, we made a set of assumptions
on the proportion of different level of patient complexity - see Figure 7.
Figure 7: Visits Segmentation
Service processes
The initial care team in the new care practice comprises one medical doctor (MD), two
nurses (a care nurse and a triage nurse), one medical assistant (MA) and one care
coordinator (CC).
The base model considers a simple sequential process for every type of patient in the new
practice. We did not consider exceptions or patient redirection in this first model. The
patient first self-checks in at the kiosk, then the Greeter welcomes the patient and takes
her in the examination room. The Medical Assistant (MA) then sees her in the
examination room and reviews with her basic patient information. Subsequently,
depending on the type of visit and the level of complexity, the patient sees either a MD
and a nurse (for new visits), or a MD or a nurse (for follow-up visits of medium and high
complexity), or only a nurse (follow-up and low complexity). Finally, a Care Coordinator
(CC) performs the End of Visit procedure (EOV). This is shown schematically in Figure
8.
NEW VISIT
Patient Checks OutLow Complexity
Figure 8: Care Processes
The main assumptions on service times were discussed during our interviews with the
care team. These are compiled and presented in the appendix. Unexpected visits are
supposed to follow the same kind of care process as medium complexity follow-up visits.
Control variables
Total capacity and throughput of the new practice are of key interest, depending on the
type of visit. To this end, we have designed control variables representing the number of
patients arriving in the practice during day:
Number of new visits per day
Number of follow-up visits per day
Number of unexpected visits per day
We are also interested in the allocation of resources among the care team. How many
nurses are we going to allocated to the care team? How much time of the second nurse
can we allocate to the care for patients? To serve this purpose, we have defined two
variables as proxy of the time the second nurse is working in the care team55:
The starting hour of the triage nurse
The number of hours worked
55 See Appendix for details
Outputs variables
To evaluate the feasibility of the new practice, track the overall performance of the
system and assess patient satisfaction in the practice, we are considering several output
variables, as follows.
Resources Utilization:
Medical Doctor Utilization
Nurse Utilization
Medical Assistant Utilization
Care Coordinator Utilization
Patient Satisfaction:
Number of patients in waiting lounge
Patient average waiting time in lounge
Patient average waiting time in examination room
The total number of new and follow-up visits throughout the year gives the number of
visits that were scheduled. We have not implemented no-show rates in the current model.
In effect, it may increase the variability of visits processed in the care practice. The total
number of unexpected visits accommodated throughout the year gives an indication of
the amount of flexibility we have in the system, i.e. the amount of open slots we can
accommodate while keeping resource utilization and quality within acceptable range.
Medical doctor is the most critical resource in the system. MD utilization rate in new
practice is expressed in percentage, where 100% corresponds to the doctor spending all of
his time to take care of patients as defined by the care process in the model. It does not
account for instance, the administrative tasks required to prepare the visit nor lunch
breaks or group meeting. In the same manner, nurse, medical assistant and care
coordinator utilizations are expressed in percentage and represent the same criteria. It is
useful to note that the nurse utilization will be compared to the medical doctor utilization,
and we will try to balance as much work as possible by relying on the second nurse (who
is supposed to be assigned to triage) or by changing resources allocation in care
processes. An appropriate target range for resources' utilization is around 65-80%.
Patients' satisfaction in the new care practice is represented by the number of patients
waiting in the lounge and the average waiting time in the practice. The total number of
patients waiting in the lounge can be used to make recommendations on the physical
design of the waiting lounge. We are considering average values for waiting time,
because extreme episodes can occur and maximum number can have significant peaks.
5.2.4 Calibration and Validation
Since the practice we intend to model does not yet exist, we calibrated our model using
available data on current primary care practices. For this we extensively relied on the care
team's experience in primary care settings. As we built our model, we put a great deal of
emphasis on communicating the model details as well as the model logic to the care team
to give them a better grasp how the model works and how it can represent a simplified
view of the new practice. Through multiple presentations in front of the entire project
team, we fostered constructive debates on the model logic assumptions and on the model
data assumptions. Thus, the entire model was developed collaboratively and iteratively
with the project team. This helped immensely in developing a valid model of the
proposed care practice.
5.2.5 Analysis and Results
In this section, we discuss and analyze the system's responses to varying input variables,
such as the number of unexpected visits per day and the number of hours the triage nurse
is working in the care team. As suggested by the project team, the new practice will set a
standard scheduling rule to accommodate 5 to 6 new visits per day, while scheduling
twice as many follow-up visits. For the purpose of the simulation, we have set the
number of visits to 5 for new visits and 10 for follow-up visits.
We defined 3 different sets of scenarios where we have different combinations of various
variables. In set 1, the system operates without unexpected visits and we are just
changing the working schedule of the triage nurse - See Table 1.
Table 1: Set 1 Scenarios
Set I scenarios
With no surprise, we observe nurse practitioners' utilization rate decreases with the
involvement of the second nurse in the care team. In fact, it results in a more balanced
utilization rate across the care team. Based on this basic analysis, we can better define the
role of the triage nurse in the care team. A refinement in this analysis would be to tie
costs associated with each team member and identify which scenario offers the most cost-
effective mix of personnel in the care team - See Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Set 1 Resources Utilization
Second
Number of Number of nurse's time
follow up unexpected spent in care
visits per day visits per day team per day
(7h)
Scenario 1 5 10 0 0
Scenario 2 5 10 0 3
Scenario 3 5 10 0 5
Scenario 4 5 10 0 7
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Figure 10: Set 1 Average Waiting Time
Again, as anticipated, the average waiting times in examination rooms decrease
significantly when the second nurse gets more involved in the care practice. It is
particularly significant for low complexity follow-up visits, where availability of nurses
is critical in the care process as it is modeled. Additionally, the second nurse can also be
needed for urgent visits and high complexity follow-ups, where doctor and nurse are both
required. Recall that the results in Figure 10 represent the average waiting times and not
the distribution of the waiting time throughout the year. Modeling such details can be
undertaken in subsequent studies when more information is available on the operational
requirements of the practice as well as the seasonality of demand.
Based on this initial analysis, we defined a second set of scenarios, in which we assess
the capacity of the practice to accommodate unexpected visits throughout the day. We
vary the number of unexpected visits from 1 to 7 visits per day. Details of scenarios are
provided in Table 2.
Second
Number of Number of nurse's timeNumber of follow up unexpected spent in care
visits per day
visits per day visits per day team per day
(7h)
Scenario 5 5 10 1 0
Scenario 6 5 10 2 0
Scenario 7 5 10 3 0
Scenario 8 5 10 4 0
Scenario 9 5 10 5 0
Scenario 10 5 10 6 0
Scenario 11 5 10 7 0
Table 2: Set 2 Scenarios
Set 2 results
As we increase the number of unexpected visits per day, the medical care resources are
working more intensely, since they require all the resources to take care of them in the
practice. This is shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 12: Set 2 Average Waiting Time
When there are more unexpected visits per day, we note that urgent visits are the most
affected. Average waiting time in examination room for urgent visits jump from 9
minutes to 24 minutes. Also, average waiting time in Lounge increases from 0 minutes to
15 minutes. It is important to insist that the waiting times are averaged over the entire
simulation time, thus small changes in average values may reflect significant change in
the distribution. Again, more detailed analysis should be performed to look at the
distribution of waiting time across types of visits to gain deeper insights. Results are
given in Figure 12.
Subsequently, we defined four other scenarios, where we make the triage more involved
in the care of patients while accommodating seven unexpected visits per day. We intend
to observe how much relief does the second nurse offer to the system. This is set 3 of
scenarios and detailed in Table 3.
Second
Number of Number of nurse's tme
follow up unexpected spent in carevisits per day
visits per day visits per day team per day
(71)
Scenario 12 5 10 7 0Scenario 13 5 10 7 3
Scenario 14 5 10 7 5Scenario 15 5 10 7 7
Table 3: Set 3 of Scenarios
Set 3 results
The results show that the second nurse can dramatically reduce the utilization rate of the
doctor and nurse in the new practice. By changing the second nurse schedule, we can
balance resources utilization to provide a more flexible schedule for all medical
practitioners. Nurses' utilization rate goes from 85% to 50% if the triage nurse dedicates
her time to the care team as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Set 3 Resources Utilization
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Figure 14: Set 3 Average Waiting Time
By allocating the second nurse in the care team, we can reduce the average waiting time
of every type of patients in the new care practice. It dramatically improves the quality of
service as represented by waiting times. Average waiting time for urgent new visits
decreases from 24 minutes to 6 minutes. For high complexity visits, the average waiting
time decreases from 13 minutes to 3 minutes - see Figure 14.
These preliminary scenario analyses were conducted to demonstrate the potential benefits
of simulation tools to decision-makers in hospitals trying to design a new care practice
model. More detailed investigation is required to guide the project team to optimize the
cost of resources, the satisfaction at work, the quality of care and the accommodation of
urgent cases, which at the end of the day can prevent patients to utilize costly Emergency
Department services.
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Chapter 6: Synthesis and Recommendations
As we review the roles of business leaders and hospitals in the future of primary care,
policy-makers must move forward to provide a fertile regulatory environment to support
and to enable disruption in U.S. health care. Since the health care industry is highly
regulated, no significant system-wide improvements is possible without appropriate
governmental actions. New regulations in the training of medical practitioners, the
payment structure of primary care, the insurance industry and the health care businesses
have to be adopted.
Yet, faced with significant uncertainty around the interdependence of factors in the
system and around the future evolution of the system in the short-term and long-term, it is
complex and costly to precisely predict the impacts of policy actions. As shown with the
simulation study performed at the hospital, it requires a lot of time and money to build a
comprehensive and detailed model to represent reality of operations and to gain insights
into the system. For example, in climate change, policy-makers have encountered similar
uncertainty challenges in trying to better understand the behavior of carbon dioxide
lifecycle. Combining immediate policy actions based on the most up-to-date data on the
evolution of a system under regulation and adaptive features embedded in the same
policies may be a solution toward improved policy-making under looming challenges.
Along those lines, Professors McCray and Oye analyzed the adaptation and anticipation
features in policy-making in the U.S.56 . Anticipative and adaptive policies should be
designed based on a first thorough front-end integrated assessment of the situation with
most up-to-data data and models and should also incorporate a back end integrated
implementation of adaptive capacity to improve the quality of decisions over time.
However, the reevaluation of policies should be made based on predefined performance
measures. It represents a tremendous challenge to define appropriate metrics that will
guide correct intended behaviors. Similar to the theory of incentives, several trade-offs
have to be made on the design of targeted, adaptive policies. Professors McCray and Oye
56 L. McCray and K. Oye - NSF-EPA Trans-Atlantic Uncertainty Colloquium, 2006
offer a segmentation of the types of metrics that can be used to track performance of
policy actions as follows.
Concrete Actions: define goals in terms of behavioral indicators
Intervening States of Links: define goals in terms of observables on causal path
Ultimate Objectives: define goals in terms of proxies for consummatory values
Strengths and weaknesses of these actions are discussed in Table 4.
Behavioral Intervening Indicators Consummatory
Indicators Indicators
Assigning Nominal Measurability Legitimating
Strength Responsibility and Ostensible
Responsibility PolicyObjectivity
Weakness Legitimating Relevance to Legitimacy AssigningPolicy and Responsibility Responsibility
Table 4: Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Types of Performance Metric
Our preliminary analyses of the primary care practice lead to some policy
recommendation guidelines. However, in order to execute these recommendations, we
have to develop complimentary performance metrics to keep track of the impacts of the
policy actions. Further research is needed to focus on balancing the trade-offs of
legitimating policy and assigning responsibility to guide intended behaviors from
businesses, health care providers for higher quality of care and reduced costs.
APPENDIX
General assumptions
The general assumptions on the new practice operations are: 180 operating days per year,
7 hours of operation per day.
Service times
Based on the first discussions with the care team, we made a set of assumptions on the
future service times, which depend on the type of visit and its associated level of
complexity. In the following table, we put together the service times in minutes for the
model as shown in Table 5.
Service Times
In minutes MA MD NP CC
Type of patient
New patient
Non urgent 15 30 (MD or NP) 10
Urgent 5 20 (MD & NP) 5
Follow-up patient
Low complexity 5 15 0
Medium complexity 10 20 (MD or NP) 10
High complexity 15 30 (MD & NP) 15
Unexpecteld patent 10 20 (MD or NP) 10
Table 5: Service Time Assumptions
In this first model, we are using deterministic values for service times. Every visit is
booked in advance for a certain amount of time, then medical practitioners use all the
allocated time to see the patient, and keep the visit within the constrained schedule. In
current practice, arrival of urgent unexpected cases changes doctors' schedule by
spreading the delay throughout the day.
Control variables
Number of visits per day:
For modeling purposes, we have assumed that the inter-arrival time between two visit 
of
the same type (new, follow-up or unexpected) is constant. Therefore if the number of
visits per day is n, the inter-arrival time is equal to 7 / n hour.
For example: 7 visits per day corresponds to 1 visit every hour, 14 visits to 1 visit 
every
half hour.
Nurse working hours:
In order to change the involvement of second nurse in the care team, we defined the
starting hour of her work in the care team and the total hour worked per day in the 
care
team. The two parameters we are controlling are the starting hour and the hours worked.
They are defined as follows in Figure 15.
Starting
E hour= 1 hours StartingO hour = 1 hours
as Hours
o Hours
. worked = 2 hours worked= 2 hoursworked = 2 hours
Z 2
S1
E
o 00 00 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 
00
Day 1 Day 2
Time
Figure 15: Second nurse schedule
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